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BOOK REVIEWS
can work himself into a lather over a single case. The rest of us
can only envy him!
Max Radin.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA.
The Theory of Legal Science. By Huntington Cairns. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1941. Pp. viii, 155.
$2.00.
Those who found Mr. Cairns' first book, Law and the Social
Sciences, a valuable contribution will find this one much more impor-
tant. For in the earlier work, Mr. Cairns, though concerned with
the relationships of law and the social disciplines, did not present any
theoretical basis for their integration. In the present book he has ad-
vanced far; while much of this book, perhaps the largest part, con-
sists of resumes of social science literature, as did the earlier work,
these are here constructed with a crucial difference, namely with ref-
erence to a sociological theory which provides a focal point and a
method of cohesion. The theory that guides Mr. Cairns is "the prin-
ciple of disorder" which "directs attention to the central fact of
social life, namely, that it is essentially incongruous and disor-
derly." (56) For him, jurisprudence "is the study of human be-
havior as a function of disorder" (1), i. e., he seeks "a social science
jurisprudence." (3)
Unfortunately Mr. Cairns does little more than hint at the mean-
ing of "disorder." It is a "principle" occasionally; frequently it is
a description, as when he states "social life and social relations are
* * * basically incongruous and disorderly." He believes, ap-
parently, but "disorder" occurred first in time, that "the order we
observe in society is an invention of man" (53), although he pre-
sents no reasons for assuming the priority of -the former. In any
event, "disorder" is not analyzed in terms sufficiently detailed to sug-
gest the utility of the notion for social research. Certainly there is
nothing new in the ideas "order" and "disorder." Spinoza employed
these terms (Ethic, Oxford, 1923, pp. 39, 43) and they can be found
as far back as the pre-Socratic Greeks. But Spinoza and others real-
ized that "order" and "disorder" were not mere descriptive terms.
but were rather polar categories suggested by human reason and de-
sire, in relation to which social events could be organized, analyzed,
and evaluated. This indicates also that Mr. Cairns has not grasped
an essential quality of human relations, namely "value," which is so
integrated in social relations as to require distinctive explanation, not
merely relegation to later separate analysis. As to "disorder," it may
be added, further, that even if it had been carefully articulated it
would not provide the most fruitful notion for construction of a so-
cial science-quite apart from the deficiencies of any particularistic
theory. The reasons cannot be set forth in a book review; the writer
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can merely assert that he has found the concept "social problem"
much more adequate, more cogent, and more suggestive of the nature
of the discipline to be constructed. Not least important are the
sharply diverse ethical implications of the two points of view.
The major limitations of Mr. Cairns' book are revealed in the basic
contradictions in his thought regarding the physical sciences and their
relations to legal sociology. On the one hand he repudiates "simple
mechanical explanations" and "the Holbachian view that man is the
work of nature"; and he asserts that "three centuries of failure
should teach us to look in new directions." (52) So, also, as to
"the shallow mechanism which seeks to explain the motion of human
affairs by parallels drawn from physics." With these views the re-
viewer is in hearty accord, and was encouraged to hope that their
significance for any social siience would be explored. On the con-
trary, Mr. Cairns, so far at least as this reviewer can follow his
analysis, relapses into the very ideology he has repudiated. He is
content with the observation that "since the behavioristic realm and
the value realm are distinct, they can easily be joined at a later
time." (145) He clings to the ideal of the natural sciences (7, 8),
"envisages a completely determinate system" (10), embraces logical
positivism as regards verification (74-75, 78), apparently unaware
that this represents the extremist empiricism and the very analogiz-
ing from physical science that he elsewhere condemns. We "can
hardly hope to emulate" the precision of the physicists, Mr. Cairns
concedes, but he prophesies that jurisprudence will "take on more
of the characteristics of the exact sciences." (90) It is impossible
in a book review to elaborate the issues involved, suggested above,
for they concern the most fundamental problems of social science.
Mr. Cairns' book is abundant evidence that the nature of these prob-
lems still needs discussion even among widely read legal scholars.
Jerome Hall.
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
ScHooL. OF LAW.
Declaratory Judgments, (Second Edition). By Edwin Borchard.
Cleveland: Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing Co. 1941. Pp.
xxxvii, 1152. $22.50.
Edwin Borchard has long been a crusader for wider adoption of
the declaratory judgment practice and its liberal construction and
use where adopted. The first edition of his book and its predecessors,
the author's law review articles, were an immeasurable influence on
the trend desired. At least a large part of the goal had been reached
by the time this second edition appeared. That is, a large majority
of the states had adopted the practice, and the courts of most of thesejurisdictions, including the Federal, had adopted a fairly liberal view
as to its scope. Nevertheless, accomplishment of purpose has by no
means lessened the importance and effectiveness of the second edition,
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